Abstract. Cut elimination is a central result of the proof theory. This paper proposes a new approach of proving the theorem for Gentzen's intuitionistic sequent calculus LJ, that relies on completeness of the cutfree calculus with respect to Kripke Models. The proof defines a general framework to extend the cut elimination result to other intuitionistic deduction systems, in particular deduction modulo. This question is addressed in a last part, where we show the guidelines to extend the result. We give two examples : a condition order on rewrite systems, and another rewrite system that doesn't enjoys proof normalization although the cut rule is redundant.
Introduction
Since Gentzen's result [7] , the cut elimination theorem has been a central result of Proof Theory. Proving the cut elimination theorem is the key that leads to many good propeties, such as consistency, disjunction and witness property for intuitionistic framework. It allows also to prove decidability of some logical fragments (as the propositional case), and is essential for proving completeness of proof search methods such as tableaux or resolution [2, 12, 5] .
Two main approaches can be used to establish the result. One way is a syntactic one, proving termination of a certain cut-elimination process, as in the original proof of Gentzen [7] . A modern way to prove the result uses proof terms [6] and reducibility candidates. The other way is to prove the admissibility (or redundancy) of the cut rule [10, 14, 1] , proving completeness of the cut-free calculus with respect to some notion of model. This has been recently used by De Marco and Lipton [4] to prove cut elimination of the Intuitionistic Higher-Order Logic. An interesting field of research is to try to understand the links between these two methods. In particular, one may ask if all formalisms verifying cut admissibility are normalizing under proof reduction.
A first difficulty for this study is that intuitionistic logic seems to be a better framework for proof normalization, whereas classical logic is easier to use when dealing with semantic. There's two manners to bridge the gap : either study proof normalization for a classical logic, either, as we do here, establish semantic methods for the intuitionistic logic.
In this paper, we thus describe a semantic method to prove cut admissibility in the intuitionistic sequent calculus. Although the result is not new, the method seems not to have been used yet. Moreover, it can easily extend to sequent calculus modulo several congruences, as we will see at the end of the paper. This is an important extension for two reasons. First, it shows cut-elimination for many axiomatic theories, without considering ad-hoc axiomatic cuts. Then, Deduction Modulo is a good framework to understand the links between semantic and syntactic approaches, since Dowek and Werner have defined in [6] general methods for proving termination of proof reduction, based on pre-models and reducibility candidates.
Our model construction is obtained by transforming Gödel's completeness theorem for first-order classical logic, see for instance [3] . We prove completeness of the cut-free sequent calculus with respect to some notion of model. The construction is similar in many aspects to Gödel's one, but differs on several crucial points. First, we here consider intuitionistic logic instead of classical logic, thus our models will have a different form. Then -and this is the most important point -we consider a cut-free calculus. This leads to many technical difficulties. In particular it requires to introduce new definitions of consistency and completeness of a theory.
Unlike classical logic, intuitionistic logic has many different notions of models, namely Kripke Structure [15] and Heyting Algebras [11] . Recently, an extension of Heyting Algebra have been used by De Marco and Lipton [4] to prove cut redundancy for Intuitionistic Higher-Order Sequent Calculus. In this paper, we will use Kripke Structure. We believe that Kripke Structures lead to much more simpler proofs, in particular they seem to extend rather straightforwarly techniques already used in classical logic ( [8, 1] ).
In a last part, we discuss shortly the extension of the result to the Deduction Modulo. An example is given, where the cut-elimination proof appears to be a very simple modification of the former. We also present a terminating, confluent rewrite system that defines a deduction modulo that enjoys cut-elimination, although the cut-elimination process using reduction of proof-terms fails [6] .
In the later, we will consider, unless specified, the cut-free intuitionistic sequent calculus, this is the calculus as defined in figure 1 minus the cut rule. To remind this, we will note a sequent like this : Γ cf P
Definitions
[4] discusses the reason why the completion process of Henkin [15] fails when we disallow the use of the cut rule. This is the case because the completion process is done with a heavy use of the cut rule. Then, the authors discard the usual completeness notion, and build downward complete sets (with respect to the subformula property), in defining a very nice tableau construction for intuitionistic logic. Here, we propose a different approach, that keeps the notion of a complete theory. In fact, we adapt the notion of complete theory to the cut-free calculus in a very simple way. The reader can check that when the cut rule is allowed, the two completeness notions are equivalent. But when it is not, the two notions split.
Our construction, and the completion process that follows has the advantage to keep the property that theories constructed are maximal. Moreover, we stick to other completeness construction to define the semantic of sequent calculi (with the cut rule) [15, 3] .
We also need a larger understanding of completeness and consistency, because we are in an intuitionistic framework. So, we will speak about A-consistency and A-completeness. From these definitions, it becomes simple to prove the completeness theorem, following the lines of Gödel's proof [3] , applying it to Kripke Structures.
Definition 1 (A-consistency). Let A be a proposition. A set of propositions (theory) Γ is said to be A-consistent iff Γ cf A.
Definition 2 (A-completeness).
Let A be a proposition. A set of propositions (theory) Γ is said to be A-complete iff for any proposition P , either Γ, P cf A, or P ∈ Γ .
Definition 3 (A-Henkin witnesses)
. Let A be a fixed proposition. A set of propositions (theory) Γ is said to admit A-Henkin witnesses if for any proposition of the form ∃xP such that Γ, ∃xP cf A, there exists a constant c such that
These definitions are different from from those used in the classical case [8] , because we are now in the intuitionistic framework : in particular, we don't have symmetry between the left and the right parts of a sequent, so we lose symmetry between ∀ and ∃ quantifiers, and we can't have Henkin witnesses for both of them. Another point is that instead of considering only consistency, we have to consider A-consistency, so sets of propositions become smaller, although they still possess all the good properties we need, as shown in section 3.2
Definition 4 (Kripke Structure).
A Kripke Structure K is a quadruple K, ≤, D, , such that K is a set (the set of nodes, or worlds), ≤ is a partial order on K, D a monotone function (called the domain), w.r.t. the partial order ≤, to some sets.
And is a relation between K and the ground propositions (closed over D(α)) such that :
With respect to Kripke Structures, we should first prove soundness of the Intuitionistic Sequent Calculus with cut.
Theorem 1 (Soundness). Let Γ be a set of propositions, and P be a proposition. If Γ P (with possible use of te cut rule), then for any Kripke Structure K, ≤, D, , for any node α ∈ K, if α Γ then α P . We will note Γ P .
Proof : We check that all the derivation rules are valid as in [?] . See for example [15] . The result holds also for the cut-free sequent calculus, but this is not relevant here. 2
The difficult part is to prove the converse, namely the completeness theorem. In our case, we have to prove completeness of the cut-free calculus with respect to Kripke Structures.
Completion of a theory and basic results
First, given a theory T and a proposition A such that T is A-consistent, we describe how to get an A-complete, A-consistent set Γ containing T , admitting A-Henkin witnesses. Then, we will describe the properties of Γ .
Completion
Let L be a language, T a theory in L, , and A a proposition such that T cf A. We consider an infinite set of fresh constants C, and we define L = L ∪ C.
Consider an enumeration of the propositions of L : P 0 , ..., P n , ... and let Γ 0 = T . We define Γ n by induction :
-if Γ n , P n cf A, we let Γ n+1 = Γ n ∪ {P n }, and if P n is of the form ∃xQ, we let Γ n+1 = Γ n ∪ {P n , Q[c/x]}, where c ∈ C is a constant that doesn't occur in Γ n .
-else we let Γ n+1 = Γ n Notice that in the first case, if P n is of the shape ∃xQ,we have Γ n , Q[c/x] cf A since c is fresh. So we don't lose the A-consistency of Γ n+1 .
Finally, we let Γ = ∞ i=0 Γ i .
Properties of the completed theory
First, we check that Γ is A-consistent, A-complete, and admits A-Henkin witnesses. Let's start with A-completeness : suppose Γ is not A-complete, so there exists a proposition P such that Γ, P cf A and P / ∈ Γ . There exists a n such that P = P n . Γ n ⊂ Γ , so Γ n , P n cf A. We get a contradiction, since by construction, P n ∈ Γ n+1 ⊂ Γ .
The two other properties are proved in the same way.
Let's see another important property of Γ (and more generally of any Aconsistent, complete theory). It possesses some form of the subformula property. Proposition 1. Let A be a proposition and Γ an A-complete, A-consistent set of propositions that admits A-Henkin witnesses. Then :
Proof : it relies essentially on the arguments that Γ is A-complete, A-consistent, admits A-Henkin witnesses, and on the fact that we can use in a reversed way the rules of sequent calculus of figure 1.
Let's see some examples :
-3 is the A-Henkin witnesses property.
-In 5, P ⇒ Q ∈ Γ means in particular that Γ, P ⇒ Q cf A. We can not have at the same time Γ, Q cf A and Γ cf P (otherwise we could apply ⇒-left rule). So, we have either Q ∈ Γ (by A-completeness), or Γ cf P . 2
A key remark, is that there are already links with Kripke Structures in this definition : at point 5, Γ cf P can be understood as the following : we can (in a richer language) complete Γ in ∆, P -complete, P -consistent, and that admits P -Henkin witnesses, in the same way as in section 3.1. So proposition 1 gives us a very easy way to construct a Kripke Structure, ordered by inclusion. This will be the object of next section.
Completeness theorem and Cut Redundancy
We are now ready to prove the completeness theorem. In fact, we will prove another equivalent formulation.
Theorem 2 (Completeness). Let T be a theory and A a proposition, expressed in the language L 0 . If T cf A then there exists a Kripke Structure, and a world α such that α Γ and α A Proof : First consider C n a denumerable family of denumerable sets of new constants. We form the family of languages L n+1 = L n ∪ C n .
In the rest of the proof, we consider the Kripke Structure defined as follows:
-K = {Γ | B-complete, B consistent, B-Henkin, in L i for some i and B ∈ L i } -the order over K, ≤ is the large inclusion ⊆ -D(Γ ) is set of closed terms of the language in which is expressed Γ -the forcing relation is inductively defined on the size of a proposition. Let for any atomic proposition C, Γ C iff C ∈ Γ . We extend this forcing relation to non atomic propositions thanks to the axioms 2 − 7 of definition 4. It still remains to check that the first axiom for a forcing relation holds : for any atom C, if Γ C then let ∆ ⊇ Γ . C ∈ ∆, so by definition of the forcing relation , ∆ C. Finally, we have checked all the atoms, and is a forcing relation.
By the completion procedure, we know the existence of a world Γ , expressed in L i , such that T ⊂ Γ , and Γ is A-consistent, A-complete and admits A-Henkin witnesses. It remains to prove that Γ T and Γ A. More generally, we will prove the following : for any proposition P , for any world Γ , if P ∈ Γ then Γ P and if Γ cf P then Γ P .
We do this by an induction on the size of the proposition P considered : As a corollary, we get the cut-elimination theorem :
Proof : Suppose Γ P . By soundness, Γ P , so there is no node α of any Kripke Structure such that α Γ and α P . Hence by completeness theorem, we must have Γ cf P . 2
Adding rewrite rules
In this section, we show briefly how the result extends to deduction modulo in a straightforward way, by showing it on two examples. We recall briefly the context of Deduction Modulo, but we suppose that the reader of this section is familiar with it, or at least with rewrite rules. For further informations, see for example [6, 5] .
Definition 5. A term rewrite rule is a pair of terms l → r such that all the variables of r appears in l.
A propositional rewrite rule is a pair of propositions l → r such that l is atomic and all free variables of r appears in l.
Example of rewrite rule on a term:
Example of rewrite rule on an atomic proposition:
In this case, we notice that an atomic proposition can rewrite on a non-atomic proposition.
A rewrite system R is a set of propositional and term rewrite rules. The deduction system is transformed in such a way that active propositions should be equal modulo the rewrite system considered. For example the new axiom rule will be :
All definition are transformed in a straightforward way, using cut-free provability modulo the rewrite rules cf R instead of cut-free provability cf .
We introduce the notion of Kripke Structure for a rewrite system, that is a Kripke Structure that has the following property for any world α and propositions A, B:
We check that, given any confluent rewrite system, the proof of soundness theorem (w.r.t. Kripke Structure of the rewrite system), the completion process of section 3.1, and the proof of proposition 1 still hold.
The only stage that differs from the former proof of the cut-elimination theorem is the construction of the Kripke Structure for A-complete, A-consistent theories that admits A-Henkin witnesses. Indeed, since the expressiveness of deduction modulo goes beyond first-order, we must have a stage in which the logical complexity appears.
So for different kinds of rewrite systems, we will have different model constructions. In some cases, these constructions can directly be derived from the one described in section 4, as we will see right now.
An order condition
We will prove the cut-elimination theorem for all the rewrite systems verifying the following order condition. We consider a confluent rewrite system and a well-founded order ≺ such that :
This order condition was first introduced by Stuber [12] for proving completeness of Resolution Modulo (ENAR) with respect to Classical Sequent Calculus Modulo. Since we have this order, we can show that the rewrite system is normalizing, in the sense that every term has a normal form.
The Kripke Structure considered is the same as the one of the proof of theorem 2, which worlds are A-complete, A-consistent theories that admit A-Henkin witnesses, ordered by inclusion. The only slight change is in the definition of the forcing relation R . We first define it on normal atoms :
We extend R in an unique way on propositions and on non-normal atoms, setting
The definition is proper, since the order is well-founded, and at every step, we decrease the order.
We yet have to check that we really defined a forcing relation. The only point to present a difficulty is the first axiom of a forcing relation. Indeed, if an atom A is non-normal, this is not self-evident to prove that Γ R A implies that ∆ R A too. As usual, we have to show a more general result, that for any proposition P , for any ∆ ⊇ Γ :
This is done by a straightforward induction over the well-founded order, rewriting non-normal atoms into their normal form. 2
Once we have the fact that we really have constructed a Kripke Structure, we remark that this is a Kripke Structure for the rewrite system. This is true by construction on the atoms, and we extend it to any proposition by induction over the proposition structure. 2
The last point to prove is that Γ R Γ and Γ R P (when Γ is P -consistent). This is done exactly in the same way as in section 4. 2 So, by the very same arguments as in section 4 the cut-elimination theorem holds for confluent rewrite systems compatible with a well-founded order. As an example, the following rewrite system is compatible with such an order :
in a general way, all the confluent, terminating, quantifier-free rewrite systems described in [6] are compatible with such an order. J. Stuber in [12] gives a more detailed example.
A non-normalizing theory
In this section, we transform a result of G. Dowek and B. Werner, that found a confluent and terminating rewrite system that doesn't enjoys the cut-elimination property. Here, we exhibit a confluent terminating rewrite system that enjoys cut-elimination, but that doesn't have proof normalization.
In [6] , a non-normalizing confluent terminating rewrite system is presented. It is defined by the following rule, with y z standing for ∀x(y ∈ x ⇒ z ∈ x) :
Modulo this rewrite rule, we can prove both sequents R ∈ R cf R and cf R R ∈ R, so we can prove, using the cut rule R (the rewrite system is then inconsistent).
The idea is to modify slightly this rule, to get a consistent rewrite system :
The same proofs lead this time to proofs of R ∈ R cf R C and of cf R R ∈ R. Proof terms are the same as in [6] . These two proofs can be combined with a cut and we get a proof of R C. We cannot eliminate the cut by the normalization method, because applying one proof term to the other and reducing it leads to the same proof term. And in fact, we have no hope to find a cut-free proof of cf R C, because no rule can apply.
Let's replace C by a well-known intuitionistic tautology : A ⇒ A. Of course, we can prove cf R A ⇒ A without th cut rule. But the former analysis is still valid : the normalization process fails if we try to eliminate cut from the proof from the following proof :
So this rewrite system doesn't enjoy normalization, however, we now will show that it admits cut, using the completeness method. The principle is basic : given an B-complete, consistent theory Γ , construct a Kripke Structure for the rewrite rule, and a node forcing Γ and not forcing B.
The Kripke structure is defined as usual : K is the set of all C-complete, consistent theories admitting C-Henkin witnesses, expressed in one of te languages L i . K is ordered by inclusion, and the domain D(Γ ) is the closed terms of the language in which is expressed Γ . The forcing relation is defined on atoms, and extended over all the propositions uniquely. With this method, we are sure that we define a Kripke Structure.
This is no matter whether ∆, D cf R or not. We check, as in section 4, that Γ Γ and that Γ B (with Γ B-consistent).
It remains to prove that we have defined a Kripke Structure for the rewrite rule. All we have to check is that the interpretation of R ∈ R and of (y R ⇒ (y ∈ R ⇒ (A ⇒ A))) is the same for any world ∆.
Since cf R R ∈ R, we have for any world ∆ R ∈ R. It remains to prove that ∆ ∀y(y R ⇒ (y ∈ R ⇒ (A ⇒ A))).
Let ∆ ⊃ ∆, and t ∈ D(∆ ). Moreover, suppose ∆ t R. We now have to prove ∆ t ∈ R ⇒ (A ⇒ A). This is a triviality since ∆ A ⇒ A for any ∆ . 2 So the Kripke Structure constructed is a Kripke Structure for the rewrite rule, the completeness theorem is proved and the announced result holds : this rewrite system enjoys cut-elimination.
The key to understand this result is that while proving the cut-elimination theorem we strongly need a semantic information, namely : A ⇒ A is an intuitionistic tautology. This information is of course not available when defining the proof reduction process, and when trying to prove the termination of it.
Conclusion and further work
We have shown how to get the cut-elimination theorem by semantic methods, proving completeness of the cut-free intuitionistic calculus modulo with respect to Kripke Structures. Then we showed how this result can extend to Deduction Modulo for an order condition on the rewrite system.
In the aim to study the links between proof normalization and cut admissibility,we have found a counterexample to the fact that proof normalization is equivalent to cut admissibility.
In a first time, we should extend the semantic cut-elimination result to other theories modulo, such as the positive theories of [6] , or to the formulation of Higher-Order Intuitionistic Sequent Calculus in Deduction Modulo. At last, it seems that one could add positive rules to the order condition, leaving the cutelimination theorem hold. Then, we can try to define the bridges that exist between semantic and syntactic proofs.
